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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~I. KENNETH WHITE,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-YS.-

SALT LAKE CITY, a
Corporation,

Case No. 7652
~lunicipal

Defendant and Respondent. ;

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The judgment appealed from in this case is a judgment of dismissal on the merits pursuant to a motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. The Plaintiff's
property is described in his complaint as being certain
lots in two subdivisions situated in Salt Lake County outside the limits of Salt Lake City. These lots abut on both
sides of a dedicated avenue and street, namely Marie
Avenue and Valley Street. It is alleged, as a conclusion,
that Plaintiff's ownership of these lots includes the
Avenue and Street, subject only to a dedication of said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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streets for street purposes, a width of sixty-six feet. It
is alleged that Defendant City installed a forty-eight
inch water main in these streets to serve its inhabitants
without Plaintiff's consent, which main will not benefit
Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff is damaged thereby because
he will have to lay two sets of water pipes and gas pipes
to serve the property. It is further alleged that the property as a· residential subdivision will be materially retarded. Just what is meant by this latter statement is not
clear. Plaintiff prayed for a decree compelling Defendant to remove the main and for damages in the sum of
$30,000.00 for the unlawful appropriation and trespass.
It is not alleged that the use of these streets by the City
for its main was without the consent of the Board of
County Commissioners.
Plaintiff relies on two points for a reversal. In
answer thereto, Defendant relies upon the following
propositions :

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
UNDER CHAPTER 5, TITLE 78, U. C. A. 1943, AND
RELATED STATUTES, THE FEE TO THESE DEDICATED
STREETS, BOTH SURF ACE AND SUB SURF ACE, IS IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES, SUBJECT TO DEFEASANCE
UPON BEING VACATED THROUGH PROPER PROCEEDINGS AS IN SAID CHAPTER PROVIDED.
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POINT II
THE LAYING OF THE WATER MAIN BY DEFENDANT IN THESE STREETS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE WHICH PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO PREVENT OR FOR WHICH HE IS ENTITLED
TO COMPENSATION.

POINT III
EVEN THOUGH THE ABUTTING OWNER OWNS TO
THE CENTER OF THE STREET, STILL THE LAYING OF
THE WATER MAIN IN THE STREET DOES NOT GIVE
HIM A RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES OR TO REQUIRE
ITS REl\iOVAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER CHAPTER 5, TITLE 78, U. C. A. 1943, AND
RELATED STATUTES, THE FEE TO THESE DEDICATED
STREETS, BOTH SURF ACE AND SUB SURF ACE, IS IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES, SUBJECT TO DEFEASANCE
UPON BEING VACATED THROUGH PROPER PROCEEDINGS AS IN SAID CHAPTER PROVIDED.

The subject of public highways or streets located in
an area in the county outside incorporated cities and
towns is covered, so far as here rna terial, in three different places in our present code. Because of this segregated
treatment of the matter, some confusion and some apparent inconsistencies may be thought to exist. The three
places in the code dealing with this subject are (1) ChapSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ter 1, Title 36 and Chapter 3, Title 36, covering the subject of "Highways," (2) Chapter 5, Title 78, covering
"Plats and Subdivisions," and ( 3) Sections 19 to 42,
Chapter 5, Title 19, covering the powers of County
Commissioners.
Plaintiff has chosen to rely entirely on Sections 361-1 and 36-1-7, under the title "Highways." These same
sections, and Section 36-1-2, are first found in Chapter
XIII C. L. 1888, where they read, respectively, as follows:
"Section 2065. That all roads, streets, alleys,
and bridges laid out or erected by the public are,
highways."
"Section 2066. All roads, streets, alleys and
bridges laid out by others than the public and
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
are, highways. A highway shall be deemed and
taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years."
"Section 2071. By taking or accepting land
for a highway the public acquires only the right
of way, and incidents necessary to enjoy and maintain it. A transfer of land bounded by highway
passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the center of the highway."
Section 2065 and 2066, above quoted, were combined
In the 1898 Compiled Laws in the language now contained in Section 36-1-1 U. C. A., 1943.
The legislation dealing with "Plats and Subdivisions" was not enacted until 1890, Laws of Utah 1890,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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page 76, and then only related to platting of lands in
to,vns and did not provide for approval of the plat by
the to"~n officials. It made it lawful for an owner to
lay out and plat land into lots, streets, alleys, public
places. The O"\Yner "\Yas required to make an accurate
map or plat showing the areas intended for avenues,
streets, lanes, alleys, commons or other public places,
also the lots intended for sale by number and the precise
length and width. The map or plat was to be a_cknowledged by the owners and certified by the surveyor making such plat, and was to be filed and recorded in the
office of the County Recorder. All these provisions,
with only minor changes, are now contained in Chapter
5, Title 78, U. C. A., 1943, the present law adding the
requirement that the plat be approved by the city, town
or county authorities, depending upon the location of the
platted lands. Section 4 of the 1890 act provided:
"Section IV. Such maps and plats when
made, acknowledged, filed and recorded with the
county recorder shall be a dedication of all such
avenues, streets, lanes, alleys, commons or other
public places or blocks, and sufficient to vest the
fee of such parcels of land as are therein expressed, named or intended for public uses for the
inhabitants of such town and for the public for
the uses therein named, or intended."
This same section, Section 78-5-4, now reads as
follows:
"Such maps and plats, when made, acknowledged, filed and recorded, shall operate as a dediSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cation of all such streets, alleys and other public
places, and shall vest the fee of such parcels of
land as are therein expressed, named or intended
for public uses in such county, city or town for
the public for the uses therein named or intended."
The act of 1890 did not provide for vacating any plat
or portion or street therein. This was enacted in Laws
of Utah, 1894, page 14, and provided for vacating by
petition of the owners of the land contiguous or adjacent
to any street or alley sought to be vacated presented to
the city council or to the county commissioners. These
provisions are found in Sections 78-5-6, 7 and 8, U. C. A.,
1943.
Under these statutory provisions no distinction is
made between dedicated streets in the city, on the one
hand, and dedicated streets in counties outside cities,
on the other hand; as to each the fee passes one to the
city, the other to the county and both continue until
vacated by the city or county legislative body upon petition. The rights of abutting ·owners of each of such
streets must be the same. If, under these provisions, an
abutting owner in a city has no present ownership in the
street, such as would entitle him to prevent the laying
of a water main in the street, then an abutting owner
in a county must be also in the same position. So that
any distinction which some of the cases seem to draw
between the rights of abutting owners in the street in a
city and a street in a county outside of a city has no application in this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The approval of the plat by the city or town authorities, if in a city or town, or by the county authorities,
if in the colmty, ''Tas first enacted in the 1898 Compiled
La"Ts, Section 2013. This is the first time that land in
the county is mentioned for platting. But Section 2014,
C. L. 1898, continues Section IV, Laws of 1890, page 76
in its identical language as above quoted, saying nothing
about the vesting of the title for the inhabitants of the
county, stating only that it vests for the "inhabitants of
such town and by the public."
Section 1116, C. L. 1907, provided, "That a road not
used or worked for a period of five years ceases to be
a highway." This is the provision which was involved
in the case of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, S·ection 36

Utah 127, 104 P. 111, cited and relied upon by Plaintiff.
This provision was eliminated in the Laws of 1911, page
287. This amendment indicates that a highway is not
something limited to mere passage over its surface and
that a failure to use it or work it works an abandonment
of the county's interest in the street.
Since 1888, there have also been some changes made
in the powers given to the County Commissioners over

highways. In C. L. 1888, S·ection 187 ( 5) their powers
over roads were expressed as follows:
"To lay out, maintain, control, and manage
public roads, turnpikes, ferries and bridges within
the county."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the 1896 Laws, page 521 and following pages, the
Board of County Commissioners was given power, in
addition to the powers stated in the 1888 Compiled Laws
above quoted, the power (p. 530) "To grant franchises
along and over the public roads and highways for all
lawful purposes," and to "enact all laws, ordinances, and
regulations not in conflict with the laws of the state, for
the control, construction, alteration, repair, and use of all
public roads and highways in the county." These two
provisions have been continued as Sections 19-5-39 and
42, U. C. A. 1943.
The power to permit the laying of water pipes in
highways was given to the county commissioners in the
1909 Laws, page 219 (Sec. 5) in the following language:
"Water mains, sewers and sewer pipes may be
laid by permission or upon the order of the board
of county commissioners, and shall be located in
the roadway section of the highway, at a sufficient depth to keep the roadway secure and to
prevent a nuisance thereon; but no excavation for
such purposes shall be made in any public highway etc., without first obtaining consent of the
board of county commissioners."
Practically the same language is now contained in
Section 36-3-3, U. C. A. 1943. The 1909 act also grants
power to county commissioners to permit telephone,
telegraph, electric light and railway trolley or other poles
along curb lines of public highways. This provision 1s
now found in Section 36-3-4, U. C. A. 1943.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This history clearly indicates an ever expanding
legislatiYe consciousness that the purpose of public high'Yays, either in incorporated cities or towns or in the
county, is to meet the ever increasing public uses as our
civilization and mode of living change in form. No longer
is a public highway confined to mere convenience for
passage over its surface by persons, vehicles and animals.
The air above and the subsurface are now to be utilized

in the transporting of the various facilities and agencies
that form a part of our economical, social and political

life.
Furthermore an iinportant distinction has grown up
in this legislation, judging by the language used, between

ordinary county roads or highways and streets and avenues created by platting a subdivision. Although the
legislature has seen fit to retain the old language "by
taking or accepting land for a highway the public acquires only the right of way and incidents necessary to
enjoy and maintain it," (Sec. 36-1-7) claimed by Plaintiff to be a mere right of passage over the surface, it has,
nevertheless, by other express provisions, enlarged the
uses that may be made of a highway, as above outlined.
In addition it has made specific and special provisions
as to the kind of title which is acquired by the municipal
authorities, including a county, over or in streets in accepting a platted subdivision. When the whole of Chapter 5, Title 78, is considered it is apparent that the legisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lature intended that the city or county acquires more
than a mere surface right, a right of passage over the
surface of the streets, when a subdivision is platted.
When the language of Section 78-5-4, U. C. A. 1943,
above quoted, is analyzed it is apparent that regardless
of where the fee to the corpus of the street may be said
to vest, the county is vested with a fee title to the street
for all the public purposes which a street is intended to
serve, and, such fee vesting in the county, the abutting
owner is precluded from asserting any right to object
to such uses or to collect compensation or damages because of such uses. The foregoing proposition is supported and amplified in the case of Smith v. Central

Power Company, 103 Ohio 681, 137 N. E. 159 where the
court says:
"The title, rights, and uses of a municipal
corporation in streets, alleys, and other public
places rest in part at least in legislative provisions. This is more especially true of dedications
of streets and alleys made by persons laying out
subdivisions or additions to municipal corporations. Sections 3580 to 3592, General Code, both
inclusive, make full provision for such additions
and subdivisions, and it is provided in section 3585
as follows:
"'The map or plat so recorded shall thereupon be a sufficient conveyance to vest in the
municipal corporation the fee of the parcel or parcels of land designated or intended for streets,
alleys, ways, comn1ons, or other public uses, to be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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held in the corporate name in trust to and for the
uses and purposes in the instrun1ent set forth
and expressed, designated, or intended.'''
The case of Edison Illunzination Company v. Michi-

gan, 200 :Jiich. 11-!, 166 N. \\T. 944 also supports this
proposition. In this case the Plaintiff brought suit to
recover damages to its gas pipes laid in a public alley.
Defendant, in excavating for a building, damaged these
p1pes. "\V...e quote from the opinion as follows:
. ~'The last clause of Section 28, of Article 8,
(constitution) reads as follows:
" 'The right of all cities, villages, and townships to the reasonable control of their streets,
alleys, and public places is hereby reserved to
such villages, cities and townships.'
"The present statute relating to town plats
vests the fee of streets and alleys in the city or
village within the corporate limits of which the
land platted is included, or if not included within
the limits of any incorporated village or town,
then in the township within the limits of which it
is included, in trust to and for the uses and purposes therein designated. It has been held by this
court that whatever the nature of the title of the
municipality in streets and alleys (whether a fee
simple or only a conditional fee, or a perpetual
easement), it is such as to entitle the public
authorities to devote them to public purposes. Upon the vacation of the street or alley the title
reverts to the abutting owners.
"We are dealing here with an existing public
alley. Before the vacating of an alley, what the
interest of the abutting owners may be, whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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more than that of a possibility of reverter, we do
not decide. He has the right of ingress and egress
to and from his lot. Manifestly, the fee is in the
municipality in trust for the public.
"The dedication must be understood as made
and accepted with the expectation that the street
or alley may be required for other purposes than
those of passage and travel merely, and that under
the direction and control of the public authorities
it is subject to be appropriated to all the uses to
which city streets or alleys are usually devoted,
as the wants or conveniences of the public may
render necessary or important. In Village of
Manchester v. Clarks, 162 N.W. 115, Justice said:
" 'That public alleys involve easements in the
nature of ways for the installation of water pipes,
sewers and other urban services for the general
welfare, under municipal regulation is well settled.'
"We are clearly of the opinion that the Defendant had no right to interfere with any structure rightfully in the alley. That the mains and
conduits in question have been lawfully and properly placed in the alley by authority of the city is,
we think, too clear for controversy. The Defendant made excavation into the alley at his peril."

McWethy v . .Aurora Electric Light d!; Power Co., 202 Ill.
218, 67 N. E. 9, is also in point here.
This was an action to enjoin Defendant from erecting and maintaining its system of electrical conductors
above and under the ground in the streets and alleys of
the City of Aurora. Plaintiffs were abutting property
owners. They contended they were entitled to enjoin a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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construction and use of the street for purely private
commercial purposes, as distinguished fron1 a construction or a use of the street to facilitate public travel, such
as for street rail"Tays, hacks, steam railroads, etc. The
court dismissed the petition, saying:
"That it (use for conducting electricity) is a
different use (fro1n travel) is true, but that it is,
in principle, distrnguishable from the other obstruction mentioned, or that it is for purely private commercial purposes is not true. That the
Company would derive gain from their use in no
\vay distinguishes them from street railways or
other means of public travel. In all such uses
private gain accrues to the individual or corporation operating them. Since the discovery and
use of electricity for lighting purposes, it has
generally if not universally, been held that, the
fee to public streets being in a municipality, with
general power to regulate the use of the same,
such municipality may lawfully authorize private
corporations or individuals to erect electric light
poles on its streets, and stretch wires upon them,
in order to provide lights for its own use, and
that of its citizens, provided that in doing so they
do not materially obstruct the ordinary use of the
streets for public travel.

"In State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 31 S. W.
784, 34 S. W. 51, 35 S. W. 1132, 34 L.R.A. 369,
the supreme court of that state uses the following
clear and comprehensive language :
"'The power to regulate the use of streets
is very comprehensive. The word 'regulate' is one
of very broad import. Under the power thus
delegated it cannot now be questioned but that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the municipal authorities can permit the use of
the surface for stringing electric wires, for the
transmission of messages, and the creation of
light, and may also permit the laying of water
and gas pipes and sewers beneath the surface.
These uses are all of a public nature, and are
not inconsistent with the public use to which the
streets were dedicated. Under its general power
to regulate the use of streets the City has authority to authorize corporations or persons for the
purpose of serving the public, to string telegraph,
telephone, or electric wires upon poles above the
surface of the streets, provided such construction
and mechanical appliances do not materially interfere with the ordinary uses of the street and public travel thereon.'
"Nor does the right of an abutting property
holder to main~ain a bill for injunction in such
cases depend upon the question whether or not the
new use of the street has been legally authorized
by the municipality. It is also to be observed that
an obstruction in the nature of a public improvement placed in the streets of a city by the permission of the city, either expressed or implied,
is strictly a matter between the city and the private corporation constructing the improvement,
so that any action to test the right to obstruct
the street should be brought by the city, or by
some public officer on behalf of the city.
"The fee of the streets is in the city. Cities
are given exclusive control over the streets and
alleys within their corporate limits. It follows,
as a general rule, that a court of equity will not
interfere with the city's control over the use of its
streets, unless the exercise of such powers by the
city is abused to the oppression of persons or
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corporations· having rights in the street, or unless
the action of the city in such respect is fraudulent,
or grossly "~rong or unjust. The reason upon
which this doctrine rests is so apparent and has
been so frequently pointed out by this and other
courts, that to repeat it now is wholly unnecessary."

In arguing point two hereinafter, we will cite and
quote from cases which we feel also sustain our position
under point one.
Plaintiff quotes certain language from Sowadzki v.
Salt Lake County, Supra. The only question before the
court in that case was, as stated later in the case of
Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959, by the same
judge who wrote the opinion: "Whether the alleged highway had been abandoned as a public easement or highway * * * It was there held that by virtue of Compiled
Laws of 1907, Section 1116, the alleged highway had
been abandoned as a public easement or highway." The
statute then provided that a road not used or worked for
a period of five years ceases to be a highway. The language of the court in Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County,
quoted by Plaintiff, that "only the fee to the surface
passed" was wholly gratuitous, and was made without
any reference to, or consideration of, the other statutes
above referred to providing for subsurface use of highways for water mains and sewers and for telephone and
telegraph poles and other uses that would necessarily
occupy the subsurface of the highway. Furthermore, the
court did not have before it, and was not considering,
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any question as to the purposes for which a highway
may be used or what would constitute a servitude which
an abutting owner could prevent and for which he would
be entitled to damages. And finally, the statutes, Section
36-3-3, U. C. A. 1943, authorizing the laying of water
mains in highways was not enacted at the time the case
was tried, being enacted in 1909.
POINT II
THE LAYING OF THE WATER MAIN BY DEFENDANT IN THESE STREETS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE WHICH PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO PREVENT OR FOR WHICH HE IS ENTITLED
TO COMPENSATION.

In support of this proposition, we cite and rely upon
the following authorities in addition to those already
cited.

Smith v. Central Power Company, 103 Ohio 681,
137 N. E. 159, heretofore quoted from.
Here Plaintiff brought action against the City of
Bucyrus and the Power Company to enjoin the placing
of high voltage electric pole lines along Southern Avenue on which Plaintiff's property abutted. It was claimed
that the use of the street for high voltage wires was an
added burden upon Plaintiff's enjoyment of his property
and that it was a menace to the lives and property of the
residents along this Avenue. The franchise given to the
Power Company by the City was not confined to those
facilities for rendering service to the City and its inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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habitants, but by the tern1s of the Ordinance the lines for
the distribution of electric energy could be used to service persons, fir1ns, and corporations beyond the limits
of the City. The rourt dismissed the action. vV e quote
extensively from the opinion.
HThe title, rights, and uses of a municipal
corporation in streets, alleys, and other public
places rest in part at least in legislative provisions. This is more especially true of dedications
of streets and alleys made by persons laying out
subdivisions or additions to municipal corporations. Sections 3580 to 3592, General Code, both
inclusive, make full provisions for such additions
and subdivisions, and it is provided in section 3585.
as follows:
"'The map or plat so recorded shall
thereupon be a sufficient conveyance to vest
in the municipal corporation the fee of the
parcel or parcels of land designated or intended for streets, alleys, ways, commons,
or other public uses, to be held in the corporate name in trust to and for the uses and
purposes in the instrument set forth and expressed, designated, or intended.'
"Nowhere in the record in this cause does it
appear in what manner Southern Avenue was
dedicated to the public use, or whether it was acquired by condemnation proceedings, neither are
we put in possession of any particular conditions
or reservations to such dedication, and it will
therefore have to be presumed that the public has
such rights in Southern Avenue as are provided
in section 3585, as said section has been construed
by former decisions of this court.
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"Further statutory provision is found in section 3714, General Code, which provides:
" 'The council shall have the care, supervision and control of public highways, streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, public grounds,
bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts, within the
corporation, and shall cause them to be kept
open, in repair, and free from nuisance.'
"Still further provision is found in the chapter of enumeration of powers of municipalities,
relating more especially to electric wires and
equipment, in section 3637, General Code, which
reads in part as follows :
" 'And * * * to regulate the construction
and repair of wires, poles, plants and all
equipment to be used for the generation and
application of electricity,' etc.
"In Section 3809, General Code, it is provided
that a city council may:
" 'contract with any person, firm or company
for lighting the streets, alleys, lanes, squares
and public places in the municipal corporation,' etc.
"Practically the same provision is found in
section 3994, General Code, which reads:
"'A municipal corporation may contract
with any company for supplying, with electric light, natural or artificial gas, for the
purpose of lighting or heating the streets,
squares and other public places and buildings
in the corporation limits.'
"In the case at bar the city of Bucyrus cannot
be supplied with electric energy without the setSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ting of poles for the purpose of stringing the trunk
lines thereon, and also for the purpose of stringing the distributing wires over the streets and
alleys throughout the c1ty. In order to have the
convenience of electricity throughout cities generally, it is necessary that the electric energy should
be transported by means of wires over the streets,
alleys, and public places. It would be manifestly
impossible to keep entirely on private property.
"It must be admitted that the decisions heretofore have not been uniform. The earlier decisions did not have to deal with the complex and
modern uses to which streets and highways are
now subjected, and with the expanding civilization
there must necessarily be some expansion of the
rules which have been heretofore laid down. In
some of the decisions it is stated that streets and
highways are for the purpose of public travel.
This restricted view is natural, because in primitive time nothing beyond· individual travel was
even contemplated. As civilization progressed,
transportation, communication, of messages, and
many municipal uses, including the product and
service of the many public utilities which are now
recognized by Ohio statutes, began to utilize our
highways.
"Some distinction is sought to be made between those uses which were under contemplation at the time the highways were established,
and those uses which have come into vogue long
after such establishment, and some distinction is
made by some of the cases between public and
private uses. But it is difficult to see how either
of such distinctions has the sanction of sound
reasoning. Some of the highways of our state
were originally Indian paths or paths established
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by wild animals. By a process of evolution they
successively became footpaths of the settlers,
bridle paths, ways for pack animals, ways for
horse-drawn vehicles, ways for motor-propelled
vehicles and electric street cars, ways for wires
for telephone and telegraph service and for the
transmission of electric energy, ways for pipes for
water, sewage, gas, steam, hot water, and other
utilities.
"Some of the streets of some of our cities
have been so recently laid out that it can fairly be
stated that many and all of these uses might well
have been contemplated. Others of the streets of
our older cities are established along the lines
of the original highways, and were laid out at a
time when none of the modern uses and utilities
was in vogue, or even known.
"Can it be said that a different rule should
be applied to the streets which were formerly the
early highways, and that as to those streets only
those uses be authorized which were fairly under
contemplation at the time they were laid out~
Under such a rule it would be necessary first to
ascertain the date of the establishment of such
a road and to make a study of the progress of
civilization up to that time, the result of which
would be to have a different rule for each street
and highway. Endless confusion would necessarily arise by drawing a distinction between public and private use and between those uses which
were in contemplation at the time the highways
were established and those which have come into
vogue by the later evolution of civilization.
"The evolution of public utilities and the
widespread and ever-increasing use of public
utility service throughout the state have greatly
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varied the uses of the streets and highways. It is
doubtful whether this great variety of uses has
really increased the burdens. The increased burdens upon the highways are caused primarily
by the largely increased population, and the demands of the people for necessities, conveniences,
and luxuries of modern living conditions. It has
been found more economical as well as more
speedy to transport merchandise and passengers
by rail, to convey electrical energy for light, heat,
and power and to transmit messages and information by wires, and to convey gas for fuel and lighting and water for municipal purposes by pipe
lines, and other utilities by still other and different methods. It is hardly correct to say that by
such new adaptations the streets and highways
are subjected to uses not contemplated when highways were laid out many years ago. It would be
more correct to say that present uses are the
progression and modern development of the same
uses and purposes. The new appliances are but
rapid transit methods of supplying the modern
wants of the people, the wires supplanting the
messenger, the carrier and the postman, and the
rails and pipe lines supplanting in part the vehicular traffic.
"Inasmuch as one of the elements of this
controversy involves the use of trunk-line wires
along Southern A venue, and also involves the fact
that electric energy is transported through the
city of Bucyrus for the use of patrons living outside and beyond the city, two authorities having
a bearing upon that question are cited. In the case
of Cheney v. Barker, 84 N. E. 492 (198 Mass. 356,
16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 436) decided by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1908, the folSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lowing is found in the second paragraph of the
syllabus:
" 'Since highways are established by
state authority for the general good, since
laws of Massachusetts make no distinction be. tween them as to rural ways or urban streets
or otherwise, and since the Legislature has
supreme authority respecting public rights in
streets and highways, the Legislature may
provide for the use of highways, as well for
through travel as for the through transmission of gas, water, or other commodities from
one place to another, regardless of the question whether any municipality through which
the ways may pass, or those who own the soil
of the ways subject to the public easement
therein, are served or in any way benefited
by such use.'
"In the opinion (84 N. E. on page 494) this
syllabus is .amplified, and the court cites cases decided by the courts of New York, Indiana, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts."
In Huddleston v. Eugene, 34 Ore. 343, 55 P. 868, 43
L.R.A. 444, the court quotes Elliott on Roads and Streets,
page 315 as follows:
"If we have not reasoned ill, a suburban servitude may not only be· greatly argumented, but
in a measure, transformed by the demand of the
public welfare. This conclusion has for its ultimate foundation the old maxium 'that ·regard be
had for the public welfare is the highest law,' and
it receives support from the principle that men
are presumed, when they do an act, to contemplate
the natural consequences which may result. It is
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also true that the benefit which the owner of the
servient estate receives from the increase in
population and the building up of the city far
more than compensates h~m for the increased
burden of the servitude, which these things produce so that he suffers no damages and without
damages there can be no right of action."

Empire Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 121 Kan.
1119, 245 P. 1058. The case involved the right of Plaintiff to lay a gas pipe line in a public highway in the
county, on which highway Defendant's eight acres abutted, without Defendant's consent. The court refers to McCann v. Telephone Company, 69 Kan. 210, 76 P. 870, 66
L.R.A. 171, and State v. Natural Gas Company, 71 Kan.
508, 80 Pac. 962, and says:
"They (these cases) establish the legal right
of the Wichita Natural Gas Company to lay its
pipe line in the public highway without the consent
of the Defendants."

Nazworthy v. Illinois Oil Company, 176 Okl. 37, 54
P. 2d 642. The State widened a highway six feet running
along Plaintiff's property and obtained the six feet from
Plaintiff. The State permitted Defendant to place a six
inch oil pipe line in this six feet. Then the State widened
the highway again and took ten feet of Plaintiff's land
by condemnation, defendant refusing to give the land up.
The State then ordered Defendant to move its pipe lines
over onto this ten foot strip. Plaintiff then brought
suit for damages as he had not consented to the taking
of the ten feet or the laying of the pipe line therein.
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Judgment for Defendant was affirmed. The court refers
to and relies upon McCann v. Johnson County Telephone
Company, 69 Kan. 210, 76 P. 870, and Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Company, 60 Minn. 539, 63 N. W. 111,
quoting from the McCann case as follows:
"The purpose of the highway is the controlling factor. It is variously defined or held to be
for passage, travel, traffic, transportation, transmission, and communication. It is a thoroughfare
by which people in different places may reach and
communicate with each other. The use is not to be
measured by the means employed by our ancestors, nor by the conditions which existed when
highways were first devised. The design of a
highway is broad and elastic enough to include
the newest and best facilities of travel and communication which the genius of man can invent
and supply."
The court quotes from the Cater case as follows:
"If there is any one fact established in the history of society and of the law itself, it is that the
mode of exercising this easement is expansive,
developing and growing as civilization advances.
In the most primitive state of society the conception of a highway was merely a footpath; in a
slightly more advanced state it included the idea
of a way for pack animals; and, next, a way for
vehicles drawn by animals--constituting, respectively, the iter, the actus, and the via of the Romans. And thus the methods of using public highways expanded with the growth of civilization,
until today our urban highways are devoted to a
variety of uses not known in former times, and
never dreamed of by the owners of the soil when
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the public ease1nent 'vas acquired. Hence it has
become settled la'v that the easement is.not limited
to the particular methods of use in vogue when the
easement "~as acquired, but includes all new and
improved methods, the utility and general convenience of "'"hich may afterwards be discovered
and developed in aid of the general purpose for
which high,vays are designed. And it is not material that these new and improved methods of use
were not contemplated by the owner of the land
when the easement was acquired, and are more
onerous to him than those then in use.
"The conclusion reached is that: 'The construction and · maintenance of a telephone line
upon a rural highway is not an additional servitude for which compensation must be made to the
owner of the land over which the highway is laid."
The court then says:
"These cases may be said to present in general the theory or reasoning upon which the cases
holding generally against the contention of plaintiff herein are based. This line of authority holds
that the rights of the owner of lands in rural
communities over and along which highways are
established must yield to the needs of the public
generally with the expansion and growth of civilization as new methods and means of travel,
transportation of persons, commodities, etc., and
transmission of messages, intelligence, etc., are devised, developed, and expanded, notwithstanding
that the use is more onerous than were the means
and methods in use at the time the highway was
laid out, and notwithstanding that the new uses
include, not only new methods of travel, transportation, and transmission by moving vehicles,
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etc., but the right to conduct and maintain permanent structures in and along the highway for
improved methods of transportation, etc., by and
for the benefit of the public in general, limited
only to the extent that the improved or other
methods of use do not interfere with the use of
such highway for general, legitimate use of the
highway by footmen, horsemen, and vehicles; and
notwithstanding that such structures are erected
and maintained by private corporations for private gain. This has been referred to by some as
the 'March of Progress' theory."
The court then refers to certain statutes to show
highways may be freely used for oil pipe lines, said
statutes giving the right to use highways for transporting oil by pipe lines, the right to condemn for a right of
way for such use and making oil lines common carriers
and says:
"and those statutes would seem to declare
that it is the policy of the State that such use of
highways, is in furtherance of the general policy
of the State, to use the highways for the convenience of the citizens of the State in travel and
transportation."
The court then summarizes the rule which it states
is the weight of authority and supported by the better
reasoning as follows :
"That is, in substance, that the new or different use of the highway, or new or different
method of transmission or transportation, is but
a further proper use of the highway in line with
the general purpose of, highways; that general
purpose of highways being that subject to proper
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supervision, they may be used by the public and by
common carriers for such form of travel, transportation, and transmission as may be in keeping
with the declared policy of the state; a chief restriction being that each such use of the highway
shall not improperly interfere with the rights of
others in the use of the same highways. The
proper use of the highways by oil pipe lines located, laid, and maintained under proper supervision does not interfere with the various other
uses of the highways."
The Plaintiff has cited and placed great reliance
on the case of Hofius v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co., 146
Ohio St. 574, 67 N. E. 2d 429. This case, together with
prior Ohio cases, Smith v. Central Power Company,
Supra, and State v. Board of Commissioners of Summit
County, 123 Ohio St. 362, 175 N. E. 390, should be considered together and illustrate the greater rights which
the city or county has in streets created by dedication
through the platting of a subdivision. The case of Smith
v. Central Power Company, involved a platting statute
very nearly identical with our Section 78-5-4, the court
holding that the abutting owner had no right to object
to subsurface use of the street for laying a gas main.
The case of State v. Board of Commissioners of Summit
County, involved the laying of a sixteen inch water main
in a highway outside the city of Akron to transport water
for a sewer district. The court there said:
"We are not unmindful of the fact that the
weight of authority, both text and judicial decision, makes a distinction between the character
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of the title of the municipality to its public streets
and the character of the title of the state to public highways outside municipalities; that theoretically a municipality owns the fee to its streets,
in trust for the use of the public, and the abutting
property owners outside municipalities own the
fee to the highway, subject to the easement of the
state or the public to use the highway for the
purpose of travel. The distinction so made is an
artificial one and not based upon sound logic."
The Hofius case involved the construction of a water
main along a county road on which plaintiff's eighty acre
farm abutted. The court refers to the statement contained in the above quotation which reads, "The distinction so made is an artificial one and not based upon sound
logic." As to that statement the court then says:
"In refering to the distinction between municipal and rural highways, the writer may have
had in mind the fact that under the fee theory, the
abutting proprietor's rights were equitable, while
under the easement theory such rights were legal.
But we are of the opinion that there is the further
distinction that the legal rights are broader.
"Had the statutory law of the state been examined it would have disclosed that since the year
1800 there has been in effect the substance of Section 3585 of the General Code (the same Section
which we quoted from the case of Smith v. Central
Power Company) which provides: 'The map or
plat so recorded shall thereupon be a sufficient
conveyance to vest in the municipal corporation
the fee of the parcel or parcels of land designated
or intended for streets, alleys, ways, commons,
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or other public uses, to be held in trust to and for
the uses and purposes in the instrument set forth
and expressed, designated or intended.' "
The court then held that the fee to county highways
is in the abutting ovvner and overrules State v. Board of
Commissioners on that point. The court does not refer
to the Smith v. Central Power Company case, but it affirms the holding in that case by holding that under the
platting statute the municipality acquires such a fee in
the platted streets as distinguishes the rights of the
public in such streets from the rights of the public in a
mere county road. The Hofius case is, therefore, authority for our contention that under Section 78-5-4 the
county is vested with a defeasable fee in the streets
shown in the plat of a subdivision in the county, recorded
as provided in said section.
POINT III
EVEN THOUGH THE ABUTTING OWNER OWNS TO
THE CENTER OF THE STREET, STILL THE LAYING OF
THE WATER MAIN IN THE .STREET DOES NOT GIVE
HIM A RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES OR TO REQUIRE
ITS REMOVAL.

In support of this proposition we cite and rely upon
the following authorities.

Wood v. McGrath, 150 Pa. 451, 24 A 682, 16 L.R.A.
715. Defendant obtained permission to lay a private
drain in a street past the premises of Plaintiff an abutting owner, without his consent. Plaintiff brought suit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

for injunction to restrain the use of the drain, complaining that it was a nuisance. The court held for Defendant
saying:
"But the least consideration will show that the
right of a private abutting owner has nothing to
do with the question. It is the extent of the municipal authority to grant the use of the street for
a p:rivate purpose that is alone in question, and
that authority does not depend in any degree upon
the * * * abutting owner. * * * The conclusion,
both of the master and court below, was based
upon the idea that the abutting owner is the
owner of the fee of the land occupied by the street,
and the laying of a drain pipe under the street
without his consent is an invasion of his right as
owner of the land. How falacious this proposition
is, is at once apparent when it is considered that
the right of the public in the streets of cities,
boroughs, and towns is far more extensive than
the mere right to use the surface of the land for
the purpose of passage. * * * It may undoubtedly,
either by itself, or by its delegated authority to
others, dig up the soil to lay water pipes, gas
pipes, sewers, drains, electric wires, telegraph and
telephone wires, cables, and .doubtless subterranean railways, every one of which uses is in
direct and exclusive hostility to the abutting
owners' right in the fee. * * * The streets and
alleys of cities, towns, and boroughs are under
the control and direction of these municipalities,
and they have all the power over them that can
lawfully exist. They are the universally recognized channels of communication between the different parts of the municipal territory, and no
private interest in, or ownership of, the subsoil
is permitted to interfere with the free use of both
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the surface and the subsoil by the municipal
authorities, or by their delegated substitutes. Any
other doctrine 'vould entirely frustrate all beneficial uses of the public streets and alleys of the
cities, towns, and boroughs of the commonwealth.
It is clear, therefore, that the adjoining owners
have no interest in the subsoil of the street which
will enable them to demand that their consent
must be obtained before any uses of the subsoil
of the streets can be made."

Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 324 Mich. 527, 37 N. W.
2nd 625. This case involved the right of the city to construct an underground auto parking garage under the
boulevard without compensating the abutting owners for
such additional use. The court quotes with approval
from Detroit City Railroad v. Mills and Breitmeyer, 85
Mich. 634, 48 N. W. 1007 :
"Whatever may have been the ancient adjudication limiting the rights of the public in the
streets to passage and repassage, and whatever
now may be the rule with regard to highways in
the county, with the growth of population in our
city have come increased needs for heating, lighting, drainage, sewage, water, etc., and with these
has come also a corresponding extension of the
public rights in the streets. Immense sewers and
water mains may be dug and the soil removed,
culverts and drains constructed, without compensating the abutting owners. It may now be considered the well settled rule that the streets of a
city may be used for any purpose which is a necessary public one and the abutting owner will not be
entitled to a new compensation in the absence of a
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ants are concerned, it is immaterial whether they
or the city own the fee in the street. Their rights
are the same in either case. So long as they are
unobstructed in the use and enjoyment of their
property having convenient ingress and egress
and the use of the street is an authorized and
proper public use, they have no legal cause for
complaint."

Beale v. Town of Takoma Park, 130 Md. 297, 100 A
379. The court says :
"The use of streets for supplying the inhabitants of a town with water is not an additional
servitude, and the adjoining owner, although he
holds the fee to the center of the street, is not
entitled to compensation as for a new servitude,
for it is not such, but only a proper or necessary
use incidental to a street in a populace place.
Three Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.)
Section 1212; Three McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, Section 1344. 'The condemnation or
dedication of land for use as a street or highway
in a city or town, or in close proximity thereto,
carries with it the right to use the highway for
the laying of gas and water pipes, since that is one
of the purposes for which such highways are used,
and is within the scope of the easement.' "

Stout v. Frick, 62 S. W. 2nd 1057. The court quotes
from Gaus and Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, K. & M. Ry.
Co., 113 Mo. 308, 20 S. W. 658, 18 L.R.A. 339 as follows:
"I think it may be safely affirmed that all
the authorities to which we have been cited by
counsel on both sides of this case agree that when
the public acquires a street, it may be applied to
all uses consistent with and not subversive of,
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the proper uses of a street and not inconsistent
"\Yith the uses contemplated in the dedication,
grant or condemnation; and it is only when the
street is subjected to a new servitude, inconsistent
with or subversive to its use as a street, that the
abutting property owner can complain."
Ga~ts

&Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis K. & N. Ry. Co.
113 nfo. 308, 20 S. W. 658, 18 L.R.A. 339. This was an action to enjoin Defendant from laying a double track in
Main Street in St. Louis and operating the same along in
front of Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff had a mill, sash
and door manufacturing plant facing Main Street, the
only access to which was over main street to haul in
and haul out materials. It was alleged that the double
tracks to be laid by Defendant would not leave sufficient
space to permit standing wagons to load and unload without danger of collision with Defendant's engines and cars,
that the street would be destroyed as a public thoroughfare, and there was danger of fire, and the smoke, noise,
and vibration damaged Plaintiff's property. The court
said:
"The inquiry to be made is whether the damages thus inflicted are such as are contemplated
by Sec. 21, Article 2, of the State Constitution,
which ordains that, 'private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.' The question is whether laying
the railroad track in the street on grade under
municipal authority, and operating the road in
the usual manner, was applying the street to a
new public use, which requires payment of compensation for damages to the property, or whether
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doing so was merely exercising by authority a
right which had resided with the public since the
dedication of the land to public uses. When land
is dedicated generally, and without restrictions, or
condemned, for a public street in a town or city,
the street, and persons who purchase and improve
the property thereon, hold their property rights
subject to all the uses to which the street can be
lawfully subjected by the public. New uses in the
improvement in the mode of travel and transportation are constantly arising. When there is no
restriction of the public use, new modes of use
may be adopted which are consistent with the
proper use of the street, without the consent of
abutting owners, though such new uses may interfere somewhat with their own convenient use of
the street.
"The public use was fixed when the street
was granted or dedicated. The License granted by
the city to the Defendant to lay its track upon the
streets and run engines and cars thereon in the
transportation of passengers and property, was
not a re-dedication to a new and distinct public
use, but was a mere License to use it in a way
contemplated by the owner of the land when he
subjected it to such uses. The lots were purchased,
held and improved, not only in view of the advantages of the street, but also subject to the burdens
of all consistent public uses which the increasing
wants of the public might thereafter demand.
Plaintiff has shown no ground for injunction."

People v. Kewanee Light & Power Co. 104 N. E. 680,
262. Ill. 255. This was an action filed by the Attorney
General on relation of the City of Kewanee and a number of its citizens and real estate owners, seeking to
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enjoin Defendant from maintaining various gas mains
and pipes now in the streets of the city. The city had
granted a franchise to Defendant's predecessor in interest. A statute was enacted prior to the granting of the
franchise, providing that the city's right to permit laying
of gas mains in streets was subject to the owners of
more than one-half the frontage on the street petitioning
for such permission. Such petition has not been filed.
By its demurrer the Defendant raised the constitutionality of this statute. The court held the statute unconstitutional as being discriminatory between persons installing water pipes and other pipes and gas pipes. The court
says:
"The subject of legislation involved in the
act under consideration was the power of city
councils over the streets. Prior to the passage
of the Act the Legislature had given to city councils power to establish streets and regulate their
use, and the openings therein, for the laying of
gas and water mains and pipes. The City Council
might grant the use of the streets, alleys and
public grounds of the city for the laying of gas
or water mains, or the erection and maintenance
of electric wires for lighting, or for telegraphs or
telephones, without regard to the consent or
wishes of abutting property owners."
Ober v. City of Minneapolis, 179 Minn. 495, 229 N.W.
794; Defendant brewing company o·wned two buildings
facing on a public alley and separated by Plaintiff's
vacant lot. The brewing company had obtained the right,
through an ordinance of the city, to convey heat, light,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
steam, and other utilities under the alley, the city to receive five per cent of the gross receipts. The brewing
company did not put in pipes but made a tunnel under
the alley to connect the two buildings and put in a conveyor to convey bottles from one building to the other.
At the time Plaintiff brought this action to recover possession of the tunnel in front of her property the brewing company had ceased to use the tunnel. The court held
for Defendant brewing company and city, saying:
"The ordinance on its face amounts to no
more than a license to subject the subsurface of
the alley to the ordinary street uses. Conduits
for light, heat, and power, like sewers and water
pipes, are now generally placed under the surface
of public streets and are not considered as imposing additional servitude or burdens on the fee
than those intended by the dedication. The public
easement is not confined to the mere surface of
the land dedicated as an alley or street. Appellant truly says: 'Water mains, sewers, gas pipes,
play their part as an auxiliary to the one time
wagon supplying those needs ; and the use of such
for public service are embedded as closely to the
surface as reasonably practicable. * * * Use varies
with form. The essence of travel in locomotion.'
But we cannot agree to this claim or conclusion:
'Manifold as to mode, manner and method is its
use; fixedly unalterable is its place-the highway,
upon and not under or above it.' Cater v. Northwestern Telephone Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63
N. W. 111, 28 L.R.A. 310, 51 Am. St. Rep. 543,
supports the first statement quoted, but rejects
the last, and so does Coburn v. New Telephone
Co., 156 Ind. 90, 59 N. E. 324, 52 L.R.A. 671; Pea-
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body v. Boston, 220 Mass. 376, 107 N. E. 952, L.
R. A. 1915F, 1005; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) Sec. 1448, and authorities there
cited.''
While it is true the cases cited above- involve city
streets, we wish to reiterate that under Section 78-5-4,
the rights held by the public in the streets dedicated
by the filing of the plat of a subdivision are identical
whether the street is in a city or in a county outside an
incorporated city or town. The statute says the fee shall
vest in the county, city or town for the public uses named
or intended. The title and rights of the county in the
streets are precisely the same as the title and rights of
the city in the streets. We feel, therefore, that the authorities cited, though they involve city streets, are pertinent
and controlling.
CONCLUSION
When the subdivisions herein involved were platted
and the plat filed of record, the owners passed the fee
to the streets to the county for all public uses. So far
as this case is concerned, the public uses are defined by
statutory provisions, that is to say, the legislature has
said that "water mains, sewers and sewer pipes may be
laid" in the highways, by permission of the county commissioners. In a limited sense that was a legislative declaration of what the courts had already decided-that
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the uses to which highways may be put must be allowed
to expand as the demands and needs of the public require.
The Plaintiff in this case has no vested right to
put water or gas mains in these two streets. He too must
secure the consent of the county commissioners to install such facilities. He stands in the same position as
the Defendant City. He simply owns certain lots of
specified dimensions, length and width, which dimensions
do not include any part of the street. He acquired these
lots by lot number. The statute requires that the plat
must show the exact dimensions of each lot. His use of
the street as an abutting owner or as a member of the
public is in no wise interfered with, as the water main,
under the statute, must be buried deep enough to keep the
roadway secure.
When the owner of land creates a street in a platted
subdivision, he knows he is giving the county the streets
that are therein shown and that such streets can be used
for any purpose authorized by law. He accepts that
result and, presumably, accepts it on the theory that the
benefits accruing from the subdividing will afford full
compensation. To permit him, or his successor in interest, to prevent a lawful use of the street, except upon
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penalty of paying compensation, is to unjustly enrich him
at the expense of the public. We respectfullly submit that
the judg1nent of the lower court is correct and should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

.

E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistant City Attorneys,
Attorneys for Respondent
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